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For the past twenty years Martin Mulsow has been one of  the leading historians 
making sense of  the world of  learning of  17th and 18th century Europe. While several 
of  his articles have appeared in English and Italian the majority of  his voluminous 
writings are only accessible in German. For this reason, this translated edition of  
Mulsow’s Enlightenment Underground: Radical Germany, 1680-1720, which appeared in 
German in 2002, is a significant event. It makes available to a wider audience an 
intricate, erudite and rich exploration into the depths and complexities of  the German 
intellectual environment in the forty year period straddling the year 1700. It also stands 
out as an example of  how to combine rigorous archival work, an expansive, dynamic 
methodology and sophisticated, cautiously ambitious theorising. Working in 
conjunction, the intellectual scope of  Mulsow’s investigation, his commitment to 
methodological sophistication, and the pregnancy of  the historical moment around 
the year 1700, haunted still by Paul Hazard’s diagnosis of  it as the ‘crise de la conscience 
Européenne’1, mean this book deserves readership beyond the confines of  German 
early modern Intellectual History. 
Enlightenment Underground opens boldly with Mulsow’s ambition: to challenge and 
revise an entrenched narrative that the German ‘Early Enlightenment’ was 
characteristically conservative, a “cautious movement for reform”. To disrupt this 
archetype of  moderation he proposes a “clandestine underground”2, a substantial if  
fragmented network of  radical German Early Enlighteners, interfacing in a complex 
way with the moderate mainstream, and integrated into broader European dynamics 
of  philosophical radicalism. With this distinction established between conservative and 
radical strands of  the Early Enlightenment, we are clearly entering the contested 
influence of  Jonathan Israel’s monolithic vision of  a pan-European philosophically 
Spinozist Radical Enlightenment at the dawn of  modernity. Polemics abound 
concerning the viability of  Israel’s thesis; we need not enter these debates here3. The 
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most pertinent and persistent dimension of  the radical-conservative divide maintained 
in Mulsow’s work is its implications for the differing conceptions of  religion. To be 
reductive: conservative or moderate enlighteners sought a unity and coherence of  body 
and mind, reason and faith, or at least emphasized freedom, tolerance and the 
advancement of  reason only to the extent to which it didn’t impinge upon religious 
belief  and social stability. In contrast, radical enlighteners more readily questioned the 
substance of  religion, and its relationship to other intellectual and social realms. If  
rarely openly atheistic, early enlightenment radical thought, drawing upon rationalism 
and libertinism, established the potential of  unbelief, the feasibility of  a world without 
religion. 
The almost fifteen years since the German publication of  Enlightenment 
Underground in 2002 has overseen a broad recognition of  the sustained centrality of  
theological and religious well into the 18th century – an academic ‘turn’ in part 
instigated by, and contributed to, by Mulsow’s own scholarship4. This has given new 
meaning to the sense whereby shifting perceptions of  religion and belief, not a simple 
move towards secularism, rested at the heart of  the intellectual transition from the 17th 
to the 18th century. Enlightenment Underground emerges as an integral component of  this 
scholarly revival. It traces how networks of  anti-Trinitarian heterodoxy, often 
emanating from the Netherlands, found themselves repeatedly at the core of  radical 
thought in Protestant Germany. An anti-platonic critique of  metaphysics provoked a 
re-elaboration of  the relationship between faith and reason. Flowing from both of  
these developments, an articulation of  the theological problems of  idolatry, 
superstition and atheism, often animated through historical scholarship, predicated a 
reassessment of  the substance of  the religious. Structured as a compilation of  case 
studies, each of  which stands alone as an inquiry into a specific controversy or 
intellectual dynamic, it is the common thread of  a contestation spilling out of  the 
fragmentation of  religious norms which binds together Mulsow’s protagonists and 
their debates. 
Tracing clandestine networks of  religious heterodoxy, Mulsow thus leans upon 
Israel and draws upon his Radical Enlightenment. In the process, however, he provides 
a substantially more cautious and less iconoclastic picture of  the Early Enlightenment 
as a historical moment. Mulsow does not claim to present a definitive picture, and 
categories of  enlightenment are viewed throughout as historiographical tools and 
historical constructs, not social realities: “it is difficult or impossible to speak simply 
of  ‘radical’ ‘conservative’ or ‘modern’”; his German Enlighteners “found themselves 
between these extremes”5. Avoiding anachronism, excavating the spaces between 
categories, and thus maintaining a nuanced distinction between historiographical 
                                                          
4 Bookending this ‘turn’ see JONATHAN SHEEHAN, ‘Enlightenment, Religion and the Enigma of  
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structures of  analysis and historical structures of  life, is ensured through Mulsow’s 
methodological rigour, which is systematically presented in the introduction, and 
manifest throughout the text. The systematic presentation is useful as a touchstone as 
we follow the complex pathways Mulsow traces through German intellectual debate 
circa 1700.  
Most refreshing in Mulsow’s method, and thus argument, is his humility. The 
seductive association between the formation of  ‘the modern age’ and intellectual 
developments circa 1700 – “one of  the most overdetermined moments in the history 
of  European man”6 - draws the historian towards speculation and grand theories. 
Resisting such a tendency, Mulsow proposes the deployment of  “medium range 
theories” applied in “controlled doses”7 as a mechanism to understand the ideas of  his 
intellectual protagonists. Reflecting this, he steps back from the ‘Great Philosophers’ 
whose canon directs the formation of  modern thought. The impact and situated 
meaning of  a Hobbes, or a Spinoza, can only be understood if  they are integrated into 
a more amorphous and multi-layered intellectual landscape, populated by complex 
networks of  individuals and institutions which mediated the transmission and 
reception of  ideas, an environment where theology, philosophy, natural science, 
jurisprudence and political thought coalesced to form intellectual constellations 
unfamiliar to the 20th and 21st century taxonomy of  learning. 
Navigating this landscape requires not broad overviews and loose brushstrokes 
but penetrative and investigative forays. For this Mulsow deploys both the scale and 
sentiment of  ‘microhistory’, invoking Ginzburg’s insistence upon the ‘normal 
exception’, retaining the specificity, complexity and contingency of  each page of  each 
text and the circumstances, intentions and influences of  each author8. His first chapter 
(The Ambivalence of  Scholars: A Jewish Anti-Christian Manuscript and its Path into 
the German Early Enlightenment) is representative of  this mode of  scholarship. 
Mulsow follows the fate of  a little known theological manuscript, written in 
Portuguese, by an Amsterdam Jew, whom he identifies as Moses Raphael D’Aguilar. 
Cross-referencing between copies held in archives across central Europe, Mulsow 
traces the origin, dissemination and afterlife of  these manuscripts through epistolary 
exchanges between conservatives and radicals, orthodox and quasi-deist scholars. So 
doing, the intellectual substance of  radical ideas about religion is integrated into the 
loose formation of  intellectual movements. Always beginning with minutiae, and 
maintain a healthy dialectic between micro and macro, Mulsow demonstrates an 
affinity between a rigorous microhistory with transnational or networked treatments 
of  scale in history, and shows how both can galvanize the intellectual historian and add 
nuance to his/her craft. 
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A Ginzburgian microhistorical approach also interfaces neatly with Mulsow’s 
borrowings from the so-called Cambridge School. Both the first and last page of  
Enlightenment Underground cite the same quote from J.G.A. Pocock – that “history 
consists primarily of  unintended performances” - and the notion that the substance 
of  a text, speech-act or action makes sense only once integrated into an inter-subjective 
context, where motives, intentions, receptions and misinterpretations not only frame, 
but to a large extent constitute, its meaning, ripples through the pages in between9. 
This is best captured in Mulsow’s reconstruction of  the biography of  the anonymously 
penned Ineptus Religiosus, which plays the lead in Chapter Seven (Eclecticism and 
Indifferentism: The Hidden Discourse of  the Religio Prudentum from the Ineptus 
Religiosus of  1652 to the Religio Eclectica of  1702). Composed as a provocative but light-
hearted satire, Mulsow shows how the Ineptus could just fifty years later be received 
and redeployed unintentionally as serious and radical scholarship, with wholly 
paradoxical implications for the ‘ideas’ it enclosed. A similar feat is achieved in Chapter 
Three (Atheism at the Heart of  Orthodoxy: On the Origin and Early Spread of  Johann 
Joachim Müller’s De tribus impostoribus (1688)) in which Mulsow traces how “atheism as 
a game and a joking experiment had become atheism as effect”10. Ascertaining the 
subtly ironic or ‘burlesque’ tone of  hitherto unexplored, often latin and manuscript 
texts, and distinguishing the strategic from the playful, the polemical from the erudite, 
is a challenging task. In each specific case study learning how to unpick these 
subjectivities and navigate texts which have “dynamics of  their own”11 is fundamental 
to making sense of  how they were used, what they said and to whom. Beyond each 
specific case, cumulatively such a sensibility contributes to further enhance the sense 
in which accepted definitions, categorisations and narratives are constructed post 
facto, and fragilely so; “the radical underground”, the very object of  Mulsow’s analysis, 
“was constructed retrospectively by those who valued or feared it”12 
Mulsow thus carves out a dynamic intellectual history. He describes it himself  
as a merger of  the traditional ‘history of  ideas’, the history of  specific disciplines, and 
an intellectual sociology, or network analysis. But in this fusion of  methods the whole 
is much more significant the sum of  its parts, and among these various methodological 
mechanisms there is an ideological constant which draws them together. It is a method 
which reflects a profound respect for the situated specificity of  the ideas it explores. It 
also requires an impressive combination of  vast erudition and cerebral agility, moving 
dynamically and rapidly between intimately understood philosophical and theological 
problematics which might find manifestation in unexpected places. Early Modern 
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knowledge didn’t submit to simple disciplinary distinctions. But nor was it without 
logic; rather “it had its own code that we must decipher”13. 
Working in this investigative mode, and following intellectual dynamics as they 
unfurl, allows Mulsow to pave a ‘via media’ allowing him be at once both speculative 
and rigorous: he sketches intellectual teleologies and structures whose hypothetical 
clarity is then blurred amidst historical contingency. The lengthy central chapters of  
Enlightenment Underground offer a series of  hypotheses which have at their core the 
problems of  the origins of  the Enlightenment and the modern. In chapter four 
(Political Theology: Reason of  State, Historical Pyrrhonism and the Critique of  
Religion) Mulsow traces how a multi-faceted enlightenment cosmology emerged from 
17th century theological anti-humanism, manifest in a conjunction of  mechanism and 
naturalism alongside a critique of  idolatry and pagan religion. Chapter Five (The 
Destruction of  Christian Platonism: Souverain’s Le Platonisme dévoilé (1700) and 
Gundling’s “Plato’s atheos” (1713)) and Chapter Six (Gundling versus Budde: Skeptical 
versus Conservative Enlightenment) extend this tract, charting how a sceptical, 
comparative and critical historical method applied to Patristics and the history of  
religion could lead to a radical historicization of  Christianity and an establishment of  
a providential, progressive, historicist conception of  history. The ‘eclectic’ or 
‘indifferent’ comparison of  confessional divisions within Christianity, with Judaism 
and pagan religions, and their common inclusion into a hypothesised natural or 
‘worldly’ religion, could combine a pure ideal of  religiosity with a critique of  lay religion 
and its political function.  
There is a common thread through these hypotheses regarding the renegotiation 
of  faith and reason, divine and human, sacred and profane which emerged from the 
unravelling of  confessional and apologetic discourse of  the 17th century. Mulsow can 
broadly be seen as cohering with Alan Kors’ well-established thesis regarding the 
“orthodox sources of  disbelief ”14 in late 17th and early 18th century France. Atheism, 
secularization and modernity were not conspiracies hatched by scheming radicals; 
rather they were “tentative, experimental, and sometimes even undesired, unintended 
or only ironically intended”15 consequences of  the simultaneous polemicization, 
intellectualization and within this the historicization and anthropologization of  the 
realm of  the religious in the late 17th and early 18th century. In all its contested 
manifestations, what we call ‘the enlightenment’ emerged from this fundamental 
disruption.  
There is, then, a powerful, convincing and satisfying argument at play about the 
Early Enlightenment in its German manifestation. At the same time, however, the 
pathways by which the various manifestations of  this argument are reached are always 
                                                          
13 MULSOW., p. 236.   
14 ALAN KORS, Atheism in France 1650-1729 – Volume 1: The Orthodox Sources of  Disbelief, Princeton, 1990 
15 MULSOW, p. ix 
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winding, mediated, interlaced with tangents and densely surrounded by outliers. They 
emerge from unlikely sources, and draw together seemingly incompatible intellectual 
dynamics and social blocs. Retaining their hypothetical quality, Mulsow’s conclusions 
preserve a sense of  being ideas in progress rather than polemical assertions. This 
endows them with a creative dynamism; as reader we are not only recipient of  
Mulsow’s wisdom, but also participant in his scholarly investigations and ruminations. 
It is to Enlightenment Underground’s benefit that Mulsow is not ready to retreat 
from a discourse on modernity: “ridding ‘modernity of  its burdens” he claims “is not 
always helpful. Sometimes we just have to remember the abruptness of  the modern 
paradox”16. But it is the “cracks” Mulsow’s methodology forces in our picture of  the 
Enlightenment, and of  that modernity, “through which we can glimpse new, more 
ambiguous aspects”17. Mulsow’s exposition of  underground and concealed currents of  
radicalism asserts the sense in which “with a grain of  salt, we could say that the 
Enlightenment was an escape from ambiguity into clarity”18. If  at times, the rhetoric 
of  clandestine radical enlightenment is sometimes a little rich, it is Mulsow’s retention 
of  that “grain of  salt”, turning over and decentring this narrative, which allows his text 
to transcend the polemical historiography of  ‘Enlightenment Studies’. Ultimately it is 
the animation of  an elegant dialectic between constructive and destructive strategies 
which makes Enlightenment Underground not only an erudite exposition of  German 
intellectuals in the decades around 1700, but also a masterly depiction of  the complex 
integration of  thought and action - ideas, human beings and the world. 
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